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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendants William C. Card, William Lane Card and 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. object to Plaintiff's attempt 
to redefine the issues in this appeal. Apparently the 
Plaintiff has decided that it would prefer if this Court would 
review some.other issues more favorable to the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's attempt to alter the issues here is further 
indication that plaintiff does not understand the legal theory 
of alter ego or the trial court's inappropriate reliance on 
summary judgment in this case, and ignores disputed material 
facts. 
As outlined in appellant's brief, Issue I is: summary 
judgment is not appropriate in this "alter ego" case, because 
"alter ego" is generally a question of fact. Specifically in 
this case, numerous material elements critical to plaintiff's 
theory remain in factual dispute. Plaintiff's brief does not 
address either the factual nature of alter ego or the relative 
weight to be given to the various elements. 
Instead of addressing the proper issues as framed by the 
Appellant, the Plaintiff argues false issues, such as whether 
Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as against 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. (hereinafter A.S.M.I.). 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 1) Whether a judgment could have been 
entered against A.S.M.I, on the unpaid open account is not an 
issue on appeal and, indeed, is not even an issue in this 
case. Appellants, and not Plaintiff, have properly framed the 
issues in this appeal for this Court's review, Cf. Yee v. 
City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1532 (1992), (Supreme 
Court appellants seeking review have the preogative to frame 
the appropriate issues.) The Court should not be led astray 
from the legitimate issues by Plaintiff's "non-issues." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's alleged statement of facts, even if it was 
uncontroverted, would be insufficient to entitle the Plaintiff 
to summary judgment in this case. Many of Plaintiff's "facts" 
are unfounded and exaggerated in order to stretch the fabric 
of fact to cover the gaping chasm between the law and the 
Plaintiff's case for summary judgment. And moreover, instead 
of viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
Defendants, Plaintiff considers only its own version of its 
case. 
Plaintiff admits that A.S.M.I, was properly incorporated, 
issued stock, adopted Articles of Incorporation and elected 
directors and officers. (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.) Separate 
corporate books were kept. Corporate meetings were held and 
formalities observed. (R. 161, 162, 141) Short of actual 
fraud, which is not alleged in this case, it is difficult to 
imagine why any court should set aside A.S.M.I.'s corporate 
form. The most that Plaintiff can show is that the two 
corporations in this case have shared office space, and 
occasionally allowed office employees to sign for each others' 
deliveries and to stamp each others' mail when received. 
These innocuous activities hardly form a valid basis for the 
alter ego liability of Defendants Card. 
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Plaintiff accuses Defendants of "alter ego" because, 
according to Plaintiff, other A.S.M.I, suppliers may have 
misunderstood the difference and structure of the two separate 
corporations. Aside from the fact that the assertion is 
entirely conjectural, Plaintiff's evidence is without 
foundation and should not be considered by this Court. There 
is no foundation as to who made out these delivery receipts or 
what their intention was as to the names listed on them. 
These bare documents would not be admissible at trial without 
foundation, and should not be considered on mammary judgment. 
Plaintiff shouts "Alter ego!" because A.S.M.I, and 
Specialties, Inc. cooperated in some undescribed manner on a 
project entitled "Foothill Village." Again, there is no 
evidence by affidavit, deposition, interrogatory or otherwise 
that identifies or provides any foundation for the documents 
from which Plaintiff conjures an assumption that the two 
corporations were alter-egos. The "Foothill Village" project 
relationship may have been that of a contractor/subcontractor; 
one corporation may have bought limited services from another; 
or simply a minor confusion in names of the two corporations. 
Our point is that Plaintiff's documentary evidence is 
unidentified; its allegations are rank speculation and have 
seen more than sufficiently refuted by specific evidence that 
the Defendants maintained the corporate integrity of A.S.M.I. 
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In addition to the lack of foundation for Plaintiff's 
"evidence," Plaintiff's brief attempts to hide from the 
court's view the obvious that Plaintiff contracted with 
A.S.H.I., knowing it to be a corporation. (See Add, "G, " 
Invoices, Exh. 4; Add. "I", Exh. 9) There is simply not 
enough undisputed evidence to affirm the lower court's summary 
judgment in this case. Defendants are entitled, at least, to 
a trial on the merits of each party's factual contentions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT 
A.S.M.I. IS LIABLE IS IRRELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE OF ALTER-EGO 
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANTS CARD AND 
SPECIALTIES, INC. 
Plaintiff's argument that A.S.M.I, is liable is 
irrelevant in this appeal because A.S.M.I, did not contest the 
lawsuit below and did not appeal. For example, we address two 
arguments raised in Point I of Plaintiff's brief to 
demonstrate Plaintiff's failure to focus on the proper legal 
analysis. 
First, Plaintiff contends that A.S.M.I, did not dispute 
the principal amount owing to Plaintiff. The assertion is 
both irrelevant and misleading. True, Defendant A.S.M.I, did 
not contest anything below. Indeed, it did not even 
participate in the lawsuit because it had been liquidated in 
bankruptcy. This fact does not lead to the conclusion that, 
therefore, none of the defendants contested the amount owing. 
Defendants Card and Specialties, Inc. attested to the fact 
that they had no liability to the Plaintiff. (See Card 
Affidavits, Add. "C" and "D"; R. 140, 144.) To aver under 
oath that ''nothing is owed" certainly encompasses any question 
of "how much is owed." 
6 
A dispute as to how much is owed is also raised by 
Plaintiff's own invoices. Plaintiff's eleven invoices in 
Exhibit 4 (See, in part, Add. "G") total over $41,000.00 of 
product supplied to A.S.M.I. Plaintiff, without saying which 
of the $41,000.00 in invoices were paid or unpaid, averred 
that $13,855.74 was due and owing from A.S.M.I. (See Southam 
Aff., Exh. 9, Add. "I".) On the other hand, the A.S.M.I. 
accounts payable records filed with interrogatory answers show 
the amount owing by A.S.M.I, to Plaintiff to be only 
$8,471.89. (R. 41; also, Plf's Exh. 3) Defendants, as well 
as Plaintiff itself, have raised a disputed issue as to the 
amount owing. It is irrelevant whether or not A.S.M.I, itself 
did not participate in the lawsuit below or did not "dispute" 
the charges. 
Second, Plaintiff implies that if the veil is pierced, 
interest and fees can be charged to all the Defendants simply 
because A.S.M.I, did not participate below. Defendants denied 
any basis for liability for attorney fees and 18% interest on 
summary judgment. (Oppos. Memo, R. 132). They affirmatively 
averred that there was not any such written agreement, as 
plaintiff argues. (R. 140, 144) And, as demonstrated in 
Appellants' briefs, there was not even sufficient evidence of 
any agreement by the debtor to pay fees and interest on the 
open account. Therefore, it is quite irrelevant whether or 
not the liquidated debtor participated below. 
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In sum, the non-issue of whether A.S.M.I, denied 
liability does not justify Plaintiff's arguments. The 
individual Defendants herein have preserved and framed the 
issues of this appeal as to their personal liability for a 
corporate obligation. Whether A.S.M.I, is, or was, liable in 
this case is totally irrelevant. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT PRESENT A 
LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS TO PIERCE 
THE CORPORATE VEIL OF A.S.M.I. 
Plaintiff's argument to pierce the corporate veil in this 
case is both weak and misleading. Defendants have provided 
evidence that A.S.M.I, did not fail to observe corporate 
formalities, was not undercapitalized, and did not function as 
a joint venture, all sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
In this case, observance of the corporate form certainly does 
not sanction fraud, promote injustice or allow for an 
inequitable result. Absent these there cannot be alter ego 
liability. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 789 P.2d 
24, 26 (Utah 1990). 
We note that Plaintiff's brief does not address 
Defendants' argument that the alter-ego theory is ill-suited 
for summary judgment because of the factual nature of the 
inquiry involved. This point has been well argued in Cards' 
Appellants' Brief, at pp. 16-28, and we do not add to that 
argument here. However, we do challenge Plaintiff's one-sided 
factual analysis (Plf's brief at pp. 14-20). 
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1. CORPORATE FORMALITIES 
Plaintiff bases its contention that A.S.M.I, failed to 
observe corporate formalities on the Affidavit of Cort 
Griffin, Plaintiff's attorney, who has no first-hand knowledge 
of any relevant fact in this case. He only avers that he did 
not receive from Defendants particular records of A.S.M.I. 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 14.) This averment is insufficient to 
even raise any issue as to whether corporate formalities were 
actually observed. Plaintiff's attorney was competent to 
declare only that certain corporate records were not produced, 
not that none were kept. Without evidence that no records 
were kept, the formalities issue was not even properly raised 
below. 
Even if the issue had been raised properly, it was 
adequately disputed by other evidence and by each of the 
Defendants—sufficiently so as to dispute significant issues 
of material fact. First, the Plaintiff itself submitted the 
A.S.M.I. Articles of Incorporation, its stock certificate 
records and account ledgers (which had been produced). (Plfs. 
Exh. 1, 2) Regular director meetings were held and minutes 
kept. (R. 161; see also 343-324) Defendants Card each 
testified that A.S.M.I, and Specialties, Inc. were run 
completely separate from each other. (R. 142-140, 145-144) 
Defendant Rasmussen averred that Articles of Incorporation and 
other documents pertaining to the formation of the corporation 
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were prepared by the attorney, and that incorporation 
formalities occurred in the attorneys' office. (R. 162, 7, 
9-) 
Plaintiff claims that Rasmussen's affidavit is 
incompetent. For clarification, the affidavit reads as 
follows: 
RAY RASMUSSEN, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
7. That the Articles of Incorporation 
and other legal documents pertaining to 
the formation of the corporation were 
prepared by Spafford & Spafford, who had 
served as attorneys for William C. Card, 
and who served as initial registered agent 
for the corporation. 
8. That, upon information and belief, he 
believes that the by-laws and papers 
pertaining to the incorporation meeting 
were prepared by said attorneys. 
9. That the formalities of incorporation 
occurred in the office of Spafford & 
Spafford. 
16. That the Board of Directors did meet 
regularly, and that minutes were kept. 
19. That the two corporations did share 
an office, but did not mingle funds, and 
did not engage in joint operations. 
Plaintiff attempts to downplay the significance of these sworn 
statements by arguing that generally averments on "information 
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and belief" do not provoke a genuine issue of fact. Aside 
from the fact that Plaintiff did not challenge the sufficiency 
of the affidavit below, a reading of the entire affidavit, in 
context, belies Plaintiff's claim here. 
Obviously, the assertion in paragraph 8 of Ray 
Rasmussen's affidavit does not comprise his entire testimony. 
In paragraph 9, Rasmussen states, upon personal knowledge, 
that the formalities took place in the attorney's offices. 
Paragraphs 7, 9, 16, and 19 of Rasmussen's affidavit are very 
specific that corporate formalities were adhered to. The 
formalities took place. Who actually prepared the documents 
is irrelevant. Just one sworn statement that disputes one 
factual issue is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981). Ray Rasmussen's affidavit alone 
successfully refutes Plaintiff's contentions on summary 
judgment and raises specific factual issues. 
The only other contention by Plaintiff regarding 
Defendants' adherence to formalities is the fact that A.S.M.I, 
and Specialties, Inc. shared office space and stamped each 
other's mail. Indeed, such cooperation in everyday business 
is not uncommon. These contentions are clearly not enough to 
find "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 789 P.2d 
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24, 26 (Utah 1990), citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift & 
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979); cL. Block v. 
Olympic Health Spa, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 938, 604 P.2d 1317 
(1979) (Informality in corporate operation will not lead to 
disregard of corporate entity if the informality neither 
prejudices nor misleads the plaintiff). 
The "formalities" prong of the two-part test for alter 
ego is firmly grounded in factual inquiry. The Court should 
not be swayed by Plaintiff's bogged-down attempt to create a 
non-issue in Ray Rasmussen's affidavit. Plaintiff and 
Defendants have provided differing factual assertions as to 
whether A.S.M.I, adhered to corporate formalities. Only a 
fact-finder can decide which assertions deserve greater weight 
and whether plaintiff's circumstantial inferences justify 
finding alter-ego. 
2. UNDERCAPITALIZATION 
Plaintiff's argument on appeal that A.S.M.I, was 
"undercapitalized," is the same argument Plaintiff made below-
-e.q. that, after the establishment of A.S.M.I., Defendants 
made loans to A.S.M.I. As a factor of alter ego, 
"undercapitalization" does not affect this action on an unpaid 
contract. Plaintiff's argument ignores the proper analysis. 
The adequacy of corporate capital is measured at the time 
of formation and incorporation. See e.g.# Bischofshausen, 
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Vasbinder, and Luckie v. D.W. Jaquays Min. and Equipment 
Contractors Co,, 700 P.2d 902 (Ariz. App. 1985). Otherwise, 
it can be said that every business that fails is 
"undercapitalized" at its end. The proper inquiry is not 
whether A.S.M.I, was "undercapitalized" when it failed but, 
rather, was it "undercapitalized" at its inception. Nowhere 
does plaintiff establish by uncontroverted evidence how much 
capital was invested in A.S.M.I., how much should have been 
invested, or how much would be invested in similarly-situated 
companies. This flaw is fatal to Plaintiff's argument 
concerning undercapitalization. 
In addition, Plaintiff's undercapitalization argument, 
even if valid, avails Plaintiff nothing in this case because 
undercapitalization is not relevant in contract cases between 
two seasoned, corporate litigants. The clearest statement of 
this rule comes from the Federal District Court: 
It is well established that some degree of 
moral culpability on the part of the 
[Defendant] must be shown to establish 
liability for a contract of a [corporate 
Defendant] . . . It is particularly so in 
contract cases because contracts are 
private, consensual relationships in which 
each party has a clear and equal 
obligation to weigh the potential benefits 
and risks of the agreement. Unless fraud 
or misrepresentation is involved, there 
can be little justification for 
disregarding corporate entities which the 
parties obviously expected to remain 
intact. 
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United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, 439 
F.Supp. 610, 617-18 (N.D. Me. 1977); accord White v. 
Winchester Land Development Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 63 (Ky. App. 
1979); Mills v. U.S.A. Mobile Communications, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 
1, 4-5 (W. Va. 1993). Plaintiff has totally ignored this 
principle and these authorities. Here, a corporate Plaintiff 
contracted with the corporate Defendant, A.S.M.I., and thereby 
assumed the risk of A.S.M.I.'s inability to pay. A lack of 
corporate capital, even if true, works no fraud or grave 
injustice on this Plaintiff. Under Plaintiff's theory, 
shareholders and directors of failed corporations could always 
be held personally liable for corporate debts. 
3. A. S.M.I. AND SPECIALTIES, INC. WERE NOT IN "JOINT 
VENTURE" 
Plaintiff argues that A.S.M.I, and Specialties, Inc. were 
a "joint venture" because their incoming mail was jointly 
stamped by a common receptionist. Subsequently, Plaintiff 
speculates that outside companies were confused by the "joint 
venture" regarding who they were dealing with. (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 17.) 
This argument is puzzling, considering Plaintiff 
submitted the affidavit of Leslie Southam in which Mr. Southam 
asserted that he dealt with A.S.M.I., contracted with A.S.M.I, 
as a corporation, and attempted collection from A.S.M.I. He 
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was not confused or misled by anyone. Whether other suppliers 
may have been confused is entirely speculative and of no avail 
to the Plaintiff. Cf. Almac, Inc. v. JRH Development, Inc.,, 
391 N.W.2d 919, 923-24 (Minn. App., 1986); Block, 684 P.2d at 
1322. 
To support its summary judgment, plaintiff submitted 
delivery notices and invoices from other companies who 
supplied material to A.S.M.I. No foundation for these 
documents was provided. Plaintiff simply reads that someone, 
at some company, typed a name imprecisely. Plaintiff 
inappropriately supposes that whoever who typed up the 
delivery sheet was confused. It is impossible for Plaintiff 
to conclude what was in the mind of the parties who wrote out 
those invoices. They could have made mistakes, the errors 
could be typographical, a mere clerk could have recorded one 
name while thinking another. For Plaintiff to speculate that 
these outside companies had any question about whom they were 
dealing with is just that—speculation. The argument utterly 
lacks evidentiary foundation and should be rejected by this 
Court. 
4. OBSERVANCE OF THE CORPORATE FORM OF A.S.M.I. DOES NOT 
SANCTION FRAUD, PROMOTE INJUSTICE, OR ALLOW AN 
INEQUITABLE RESULT 
The Plaintiff merely claims that the loans from 
Specialties, Inc. to A.S.M.I, "prove" an inequitable 
16 
undercaptialization. However, plaintiff fails to show any 
inequity, fraud, or injustice to Plaintiff in this case—an 
essential prong to an alter ego analysis. To meet this prong, 
the offending fraudulent conduct must be specifically aimed at 
the Plaintiff. Cf. Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26. As noted, 
there is no evidence that "undercapitalization" existed. Even 
if it did, there is no inequity to Plaintiff. If Specialties, 
Inc. loaned money to A.S.M.I., the infusion of capital by 
loans certainly did not create any "inequity" to Plaintiff. 
Almac, Inc. , 391 N.W.2d at 923 (the creation of debt equity 
was not an undercapitalization). If Plaintiff charged 
A.S.M.I. $41,000.00 for labor and materials, and now admits 
that over $27,000.00 was paid, then clearly Plaintiff 
significantly benefited from Defendants' loans to A.S.M.I. 
An inequitable result in this case would be to pierce the 
corporate veil and to hold Defendants Card personally liable 
for debts that were contracted as, and expected by all parties 
including the Plaintiff, to remain the corporate debts of 
A.S.M.I. The trial court's decision to pierce the corporate 
veil of A.S.M.I, on summary judgment must be reversed. 
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POINT III 
EVEN IF THE CORPORATE VEIL OF 
A.S.M.I. IS SET ASIDE, 
DEFENDANTS CARD ARE NOT 
PERSONALLY LIABLE 
Plaintiff argues that the Cards are personally liable 
just because they were officers or directors of A.S.M.I. 
Plaintiff attempts to support that argument with cases 
inapplicable to the issues in this case. 
Plaintiff cites Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), for the proposition that officers or 
directors may be held liable. Labadie Coal does not hold that 
an officer or director must bear liability for alter ego. 
Instead, the circuit court reversed the trial court's ruling 
to leave the corporate veil intact. The case was returned to 
the trial court for further factual consideration whether 
defendant officer so controlled the corporation that he should 
be held liable on the same theory as a stockholder would be. 
In fact, this case supports Defendants' argument that piercing 
the corporate veil is a matter best left to a factual 
determination. 
Labadie Coal has never been cited by any other court as 
authority for Plaintiff's proposition here. Indeed, 
Plaintiff's rationale and LaBadie Coal were expressly rejected 
in Walk-In Medical Centers, Inc. v. Breuer Capital. Corp., 778 
F. Supp. 1116, 1124 (D. Colo. 1991). 
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If, as Plaintiff claims, the issue is only one of 
"control," the relevant facts are clearly disputed by 
Defendants Card. (R. 141, 144) Both Bill and Lane "took no 
part in running its business . • . [and] received no 
compensation for acting as an officer . . . " (R. 141, 144; 
R. 159). Plaintiff cannot justify summary judgment in the 
face of these sworn statements. 
If Plaintiff now claims that "control" is its theory, 
then the question is a factual one, inappropriate for summary 
judgment. The relative credibility of Cards' sworn 
allegations is accepted and not questioned or weighed on 
summary j udgment. 
Plaintiff stretches its point beyond reason to cases 
outside the alter ego arena altogether. See Rose's Stores, 
Inc. v. Padgett, 303 S.E.2d 344 (N.C.App. 1983) (A nonresident 
corporate defendant had the minimum requisite contacts with 
the forum state for jurisdictional purposes because of the 
contacts of its officer/director); Shades Ridge Holding Co., 
Inc. v. U.S., 880 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989), (whether a family 
corporation was a taxpayer's nominee for tax purposes);1 and 
Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. International Distillers and 
Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Dir. 1973) (applying the 
Plaintiff's citation Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v. 
U.S., 880 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1989) was modified and superseded 
on rehearing by Shades Ridge Holding Co., Inc. v. U.S., 888 F.2d 
725 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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"instrumentality rule" between parent and subsidiary 
corporations). These cases are irrelevant to the issue here 
of summary judgment. 
Plaintiff does not provide any persuasive authority that 
on summary judgment alter ego should extend beyond the 
shareholder to reach mere officers and directors. In Utah, 
alter ego is a doctrine of shareholder liability. 
Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 26. If this rule is to be extended 
to include nonshareholders, then surely it must be after a 
full trial where the facts are fully aired and determined. 
If Plaintiff's theory is based upon something other than 
"shareholder liability," then such a theory was never pleaded 
below and Plaintiff may not now interject new theories to 
bolster its pleadings. See, e.g.. Allisen v. American Legion 
Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988). In this case, the 
Plaintiff alleged alter ego. (A. Comp., R. 91-89.) The Court 
below expressly limited its grant of summary judgment to alter 
ego liability. (R. 253.) 
The authorities cited by Plaintiff are neither supportive 
nor dispositive of the alter ego issue on summary judgment. 
Defendants Card were not shareholders of A.S.M.I, and are not 
personally liable for that corporation's debt. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND INTEREST ON 
ITS OPEN ACCOUNT 
Plaintiff's brief argues that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 
(1953 as amended) justifies the summary award of attorneys 
fees and 18% interest. (Brief of Appellee, p. 11). Again, 
Plaintiff misperceives the law and the legal nature of the 
open account relationship between Plaintiff and A.S.M.I. And, 
neither Plaintiff nor the lower court relied on the U.C.C. to 
justify an award of attorney fees and the high interest rate. 
Plaintiff's "periodic billing statements" were not an 
"acceptance" as contemplated by Section 70A-2-207. There is 
no evidence in the record as to who made the asserted offer, 
or when—or what the terms of the offer were. Neither does 
Plaintiff show whether or when the "offer" was "accepted." 
And, Plaintiff ignores that these questions require a factual 
inquiry. 
In fact, nothing in the record suggests how the alleged 
agreement between Plaintiff and A.S.M.I, was arrived at. The 
open account agreement was already in existence before 
Plaintiff began performance by delivering goods to A.S.M.I. 
(Add. "I"). A "periodic billing statement" which is sent to a 
buyer to collect for goods which have already been delivered 
cannot automatically alter contract terms which were already 
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assented to prior to performance. Section 2-207 applies to 
terms of an offer at the time of acceptance and not to later 
modifications of contracts already in existence. 
Plaintiff's roving idea of "acceptance" and modification 
would lead to rampant uncertainty between merchants as to 
agreed business terms. Under Plaintiff's argument, any 
billing statement containing any language at variance with 
contract terms would automatically modify the agreed contract 
terms. Such use of forms to modify terms in an ongoing 
relationship has long been addressed and settled. New "terms" 
on attorney fees and interest that first appear in invoices 
are not terms of the contract unless clearly bargained for and 
assented to by the party billed. Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. 
House of Fine Meats, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 
(1973). This argument was not addressed by Plaintiff who, 
again, tries to hide the relevant issue from the court by 
arguing an improper reliance on Section 7QA-2-207. 
Even if Section 70A-2-207 applied to this transaction, 
Plaintiff's argument fails by the terms of the statute. 
Section 2-207(2)(b) states that additional terms in the 
"acceptance" that "materially alter" a contract do not become 
part of the contract. Attorney's fees and 18% interest are 
certainly "material" terms for which the parties should 
bargain and assent. In this case, the claimed fees and 18% 
interest virtually exceed the unpaid account. Such important 
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terms do not automatically become part of an open account 
contract relationship just because the seller decides to add 
them on its invoice in microscopic type under a heading of 
"Payment Policy." 
Attorney's fees and interest language included in 
invoices and other "billing statements" after the fact do not 
become terms of the contract unless the buyer clearly consents 
thereto. And, in addition to the lack of any such agreement 
between A.S.M.I, and Plaintiff, Defendants clearly aver that 
they made no such agreements and have no personal liability 
under Plaintiff's alter-ego theory. This issue of fees and 
interest is clearly in dispute in this case. The summary 
judgment awarding attorney's fees and interest must be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's attempts to redirect this Court onto non-
issues and minor points must be disregarded. Defendants Card 
and Specialties, Inc. cannot be held liable on a theory of 
alter ego because it is inappropriate to pierce the veil in 
this case on summary judgment. Even if the veil were pierced, 
William and Lane Card could not be held liable due to their 
lack of shareholder status and lack of participation in 
management and control of A.S.M.I. Also, the Plaintiff is not 
entitled to attorneys fees and interest. 
23 
Therefore, the summary judgment of the circuit court must 
be set aside and the case remanded for a fact trial under the 
proper legal standards. 
Respectfully submitted this LA day of April, 1994. 
ciarTc R. Nielsen 
Stepherf L. Henriod 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
William C* and Wm. Lane Card 
and Architectural 
Specialties, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Affidavit William C. Card, R. 142-140 
filed 3/13/92 
R. Steven Chambers (0613) 
Attorney for defendants Card, 
and Arch i t ec tura l S p e c i a l t i e s , Inc . 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-3411 
FILED ^ ^ ' 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
0 , Utah County StauoHnah 
W ^ B S ^ H . Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC., 
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, WILLIAM C. CARD, 
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and 
and ROY RASMUSSEN, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM C. CARD 
Civil No. CV 89 102 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
William C. Card, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this case and have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. If called to 
testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. Architectural Specialties, Inc., is a Utah corporation 
whose shareholders are myself and my son William Lane Card. The 
Addendum C 
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two of us manage its business. At no time has Ray Rasmussen been 
involved in the management of Architectural Specialties, Inc. It 
was formed to provide specialty work in connection with building 
construction, such as doors, windows, and the like. 
3. Architectural Sheet Metal was a corporation formed by 
Ray Rasmussen to carry on sheet metal work such as heating and 
air conditioning duct work and the like. The line of work of 
Architectural Sheet Metal was completely different from that of 
Architectural Specialties. 
4. The shareholders of Architectural Sheet Metal were 
Architectural Specialties, William Griswold and Ray Rasmussen. 
At no time have I been a shareholder of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
5. Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural 
Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business. Ray 
Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did 
not consult with me regarding its operation. I received no 
compensation for acting as an officer of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
6. Architectural Specialties did not make use of 
Architectural Sheet Metal's funds or assets. 
7. Architectural Specialties filed its own tax return and 
did not include any income derived by Architectural Sheet Metal. 
8. Although Architectural Specialties and Architectural 
Sheet Metal were operated out of the same office, they did not 
share employees or bank accounts. 
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9. Neither Ray Rasmussen nor anyone from Architectural 
Sheet Metal was authorized to sign any documents for 
Architectural Specialties. 
10. I have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff 
in connection with its motion for summary judgment. The persons 
who signed those invoices were not an officer or director of 
Architectural Specialties, were not authorized to bind 
Architectural Specialties, nor were those persons an agent of 
myself nor similarly authorized to bind me. I believe that these 
persons signed the invoices simply because they happened to be 
present when the materials were delivered. I had no knowledge of 
these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit. 
11. To the best of my knowledge there has never been a 
written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on 
the one hand and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods 
purchased from plaintiff. 
Further the affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated March 11, 1992. Q\ ys~\ / J /-— 
C. Car< 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11, 1992. 
Commission expires: 
ADDENDUM D 
Affidavit Wm. Lane Card, R. 145-143 
filed 3/3/92 
R. Steven Chambers (0613) 
Attorney for defendants Card, 
and Architectural Specialties, Inc. 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-3411 
F I L E D 3 ( 5 
Fourth Judicial Olttrlet Court 
of Utah Courm Stan of Utah 
CARMA ti SMITH Clark 
— ^W-t Oaputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC., 
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, WILLIAM C. CARD, 
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and 
and ROY RASMUSSEN, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM LANE CARD 
Civil No. CV 89 102 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
William Lane Card, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this case and have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. If called to 
testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am not and have never been a shareholder of 
Architectural Sheet Metal. 
Addendum D 
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3- Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural 
Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business. Ray 
Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did 
not consult with me regarding its operation. I received no 
compensation for acting as an officer of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
4. I have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff 
in connection with its motion for summary judgment. The person 
who signed those invoices was not an officer or director of 
Architectural Specialties, was not authorized to bind 
Architectural Specialties, nor was that person an agent of 
myself nor similarly authorized to bind me. I believe that this 
person signed these invoices simply because he happened to be 
present when the materials were delivered. I had no knowledge of 
these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit. 
5. To the best of my knowledge there has never been a 
written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on 
the one hand and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods 
purchased from plaintiff. 
6. I have read the Affidavit of William C. Card, submitted 
herewith, and agree with all the statements therein. All those 
statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, 
information and belief. 
Further the affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated March 11, 1992. * ^ 
William Lane Card 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11, 
.SNXSRP*0 
Commission expires: 
<&A^~. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
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ADDENDUM G 
Exhibit 4 
Southam-Warburton "Invoices" 
to 
A.S.M.I (4 of 11) 
SOUTHAM-WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
450 Wast State 
Pleasant Grove. Utah 34062 
801 785-3551 
SUWeU 
20^89 
JOB 
SITE 
DATE soioa* 
7-&>-&• ^ 
QTY Q6SCPIPTION ^ «f P R | C £ ^ j ^ AMOUNT 
AJllltJlXL<L- ' ' i / lk '¥-A#Jl\?0 
o 
/&&[¥£ 
AX a is*3 M)C 
TAX ! /fl_i^ Payment Policy . Recipient agrees »o pay ail lawful collection costs including fecal ex- , , , 
oenses and a reasonable attorneys *e« plus interest at the rate of 1 5% I
 T r . T A , I / fl I n\ 
per montn if this account is not paid in full within 30 days of *he aatei T O T A L / / / / j 
snown aoove Further seller maxes no warranty of mercnantaoihty or 
'he goods or of *heir 'itness 'or any particular purpose 
Return Policy 
' Material *o oe returned n full cartons only and n good sa eaoie condition 
2 No returns allowed on special order tems or on tools 
3 *5% resrocKing cnarge to aopiy on ail 'eturns exceot ^ren 'efurn zue ro our error 
4 Ail material to oe 'etumec on oreoaiQ casts 
5 No 'e'urns en discontinued tems 
3ECSVEO3 
2L 
• <<£ys^//*J<~ 
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% 
SOUTHAM-WAHBURTOtf ALUMINURT ^ 
8«t 7B5-3M1S "-..•".-.,'• "•-" ; " 
BILL 
TO 
'-4 m&& *m 
pennaa iod:» • !•<*• rtfminjH.6wplU*lnfrragtumgr*tg^t.3,*>r - , P • A t t f ^ l 
' parmcntkftfol»acco**HiNiBr|j^fil I 
Return Pofic* r ^ T U - / . ~—: - *-
T. VUtartifcto bar«tui»«tfii*Wt carton*.oetjtantfciit good «*••£*•-ccrxMJcnt 
2. No rtturoa allow**©!*spado* ordar itams or on tools. 
X TS%*rB€toc#MC*«rg*1on*>p^on'airr%^ 
4. AQ mafariai to Daxatuena&an prapattbasis. 
£ H&mturrmon 
McCSVCOSY 
A 
) 
SOUTHAM-WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
am 
TO ARCHITECTURAL SHEET MFTAI 
350 So. 400 g. 
SALT LAKE CITY. HT. fttttf 
4 S O W M t S U t » 
Pfaasanf Gso+m. Utaft S40S2 
SOT 78WS5T 
JOS-
SITE 
20661 
FMfi» JOB 
P. ft. » flfif f g 
SATS 
8-19-86 
5CLO 3t 
Les 
GTY. 
JL 
CHANGE 
chg~ 
MOS&RETO: 
DESCRIPTION 
I 1,057 set, f t T*~»i ( fe f la fe 
I PftfCS If 
stock .9*1-2:" 
Blue- seanr coveFS 
! Tee<;ltp$ t a ^ lff ifr.fr '-Ofr 
FTae stacle 3ff sfteets fr3f-5ft 
PAKXOUT 
AMOUNT 
»Z5W 
F f . t *3t«B 
aafaT/c* G$G& 
or 
Payment Policy 
Pactqant a y m to pa> >gt«w*o» cortactfoyt caaWnctadlc^lay.? aw E 
3«n3«a>dnd «f^aaonao^atfo<n«yj^>pHi3inrf •ia^tfl^rmi»Bo»f^fltfc 
par men tfr i f rms- account I s notpakE U* fui**rtftfnOff<2***arm*<iai* 
S/JOWIT aoov«. Furtn*r sailer makes no gaaranrp at rpicnauuflrtlfE o*' 
tna> gooda or of tnair »tn#s* tor any oayttottarpuipoaaiL 
1. M«ana±tab*r*tum.ja in fui* carton* o n * r a ^ i « » o ^ ^ 
2. No raturrs ui&mmon so«cta*ord«rifam9io*o<»toci«. 
1 15% rtatociun^ crtarga> to aoc*r orr a^ ratu/Tisaacac* ^arTraturatfuajtaaucan-ofe 
4. Ail m*t*oai ro 3« rtfum»Ki on ?raoaic: daats. 
S-Ho-ratum* on <3lscont1nu»JO>itatn«. 
fr 6r>noi6ff 
* - -
-7— 
&ft 
SOUTHAMrWARBURXQItt ALUMINUM 
TO Architectural Sheet Metal 
4 « » W w t S t M * 
. P I « M M 4 : OroMt. Utah S4062 
.•-r.aon 78»088»- ' 
JOB 
SITE 
,..20662" 
Foothill Job 
f>-0t 186*15 
DATE 
am 
t& ;^r£:*#^^^ 
. sou? ar-
t«3 -
CASH I .CHECK. 
UttCFKPTiQ**, 
CHANGE MOS€-flETD. 
•PFHCE- • - rAMeUM^-'r^r-
T.- ~ 
Z: 
wtunv du» tc ouf arrer. 
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ADDENDUM I 
Exhibit 9 
Affidavit of L. Southam 
(in support of Summary Judgment) 
RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No. 1363 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No. 5711 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C 
Attorney for Defendant 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON ALUMINUM ) 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ) LESLIE R. SOUTHAM 
vs. ) 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC- ) Civil No. CV-89-102 
a Utah Corporation, RAY ) 
RASMUSSEN; WILLIAM LANE CARD; ) 
WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM L. ) 
GRISWOLD; AND ARCHITECTURAL ) 
SPECIALTIES, INC. a Utah ) 
Corporation ) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Leslie R. Southam, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am the Vice President of Southam and Warburton 
Aluminum Company, the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; and 
that in such capacity, I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth in this Affidavit. 
2. Southam and Warburton Aluminum Company provided labor 
and material to Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal Inc. in the 
1 
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amount of $13,855.74 on and between August 14, 1986 and March 12, 
1987. 
3. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal was billed for 
the above stated amount. 
4. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal did not, and has 
not at any time, indicated to Plaintiff that the labor and 
material were not satisfactory, nor have the Defendants returned 
any of the materials nor requested that additional work be done. 
5. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal has failed to pay 
on this matter despite the fact that demand has been made 
therefore. 
DATED this /yQ day of October^1991. 
Subscribed and sworn . to before me this day of p to I 
October, 1991, by ^ ^ A c / f . ^ W - ^ . 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
^7^/2^^^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING IN: 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served this REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS CARD AND ARCHITECTURAL SPECIALTIES, INC. by mailing 
two copies by first class mail, postage prepaid on the C^ 
day of April, 1994 to: 
Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
306 West Main 
American Fork, UT 84003 
W. Andrew McCullough 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
Rasmussen and Griswold 
930 South State #10 
Orem, UT 84058 
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